It is not the purpose of this article to analyse the aims and results of the Russian military aggression which, in fact, requires a special study. Herein, the author is mainly focused upon certain the shortcomings in Georgian foreign policy v. Russia.

The main reason for Georgia’s disagreement and confrontation with Russia is its pro-Western orientation. Because of this, Moscow impeded any settlement of the Abkhazian and Tskhinvali problems throughout the 1990s and supported their separatist regimes in order to exert pressure on Tbilisi which in turn forced Georgia into deeper co-operation with the West.

Nevertheless, Georgia succeeded in driving Russian frontier troops out of its territory during this period and even reached an agreement upon the Russian military bases in Istanbul in 1999 which began its implementation in 2001.

In the late 1990s, the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil-pipeline, increasing co-operation with the United States, the concentration of Chechen militants in the Pankisi Gorge and, later, the initiation of the Training and Equipment Programme with support of the US turned out to be the main irritants for Moscow which resulted in an overall deterioration of Georgian-Russian relations which reached its climax in 2002-2003.

This notwithstanding, positive trends could also be observed in trade and economic relations between the two countries which was largely due to the inter-governmental commission working upon these issues. At the same time, regular contacts were maintained between the executive and legislative bodies and Security Councils of Georgia and Russia.

Between 2001-2003, both sides worked upon the Friendship and Co-operation Agreement between Russia and Georgia within an active programme of cultural and other exchanges.
The six-month “honeymoon” in the relationship between the two countries following the Rose Revolution came to an end with the development of the dramatic events in the Tskhinvali Region in August of 2004 in which Moscow wholly blamed Georgian authorities for igniting a spiral of worsening relations between the countries.

It seems that Georgian authorities became disappointed in the prospects of a broad dialogue with Russia, and perhaps too quickly so, within the new realities following the “coloured revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine when Moscow was perceived to have lost its weight and initiative within the CIS area. The destructive rhetoric, which was gaining strength in the Georgian and Russian media, caused more and more people–and on both sides — to become involved.

Beginning from this period, all contacts with Russia became limited nearly in their entirety to summits (and usually within the CIS framework) whilst relations were curbed significantly at various other levels. Specifically, inter-parliamentary relations and co-operation between their respective offices were restricted to the minimum whilst the bilateral inter-governmental economic commission stopped functioning at all. Dialogue with Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia was conducted by the Georgian side mainly through Western intermediaries in the hopes that Russia would undertake relevant steps under pressure from the West.

(President Bush openly appealed to the Georgian authorities during his visit to Georgia in 2005 to seek understanding with Russia. Georgia’s European partners persistently urged Tbilisi to do the same.)

With practically no coherent dialogue between the two countries, Moscow came to the conclusion that the Government of Georgia was simply a puppet manipulated by Washington and so relevant issues related to Georgia should be discussed directly with the West.

This perception was supported by the limited activity of the Georgian Embassy in Moscow beginning from 2005 and the closing of the Russia Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Links with Russia were dramatically cut off at various levels including those with the regions and the Georgian diaspora therein within a process which was accompanied by insults and rash pronouncements.

The Abkhaz and South Ossetian separatists, together with their Russian supporters, took advantage of the vacuum formed in Georgian-Russian relations to launch an unprecedented anti-Georgian campaign in Russia and, moreover, this was accomplished without any serious opposition from the Georgian side whatsoever.

This mutual resentment reached its peak within the absence of a necessary dialogue in the following period. At times, it even seemed that such tension played into the hands of the Georgian and Russian authorities, namely in terms of abstracting from internal challenges. With the notorious espionage scandal, the tension increased even more with Moscow making completely illegal steps in response to the theatrical Georgian démarche imposing economic sanctions upon the country. Many Georgian citizens were deported from the Russian Federation in the most humiliating way.

Notwithstanding the tense relationship between the two countries, an agreement was reached in 2005 upon the withdrawal of the Russian military bases from Batumi and Akhaltsikhe before 2008 with Russia fulfilling its commitments. Representatives of the Russian Federation asserted that whilst reaching an understanding on this issue, Georgia formally committed itself to establishing a joint Georgian-Russian Counter-Terrorist Centre in Tbilisi which, however, failed to be realised. Although little is known about this issue, Moscow took the advantage to blame Georgia for reneging upon its word.

In 2007, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation worked out a National Foreign Policy Concept within which Georgia was the only country presented as an enemy of Moscow. Such an assessment required serious analysis and practical steps in order to improve relations with Russia as much as possible. Georgia, however, took up the challenge and followed the escalation of confrontation between the two countries.

The Government of Georgia refrained from the acknowledgment of its negative approach towards the independence of Kosovo which was a serious mistake. It was not likely that the West would criticise Georgia for its clear-cut negative position. It was evident that the status of Kosovo was a matter of prime importance for Georgia and not one of political opportunism. Such a restraining approach of official Tbilisi provided Russia with more freedom of manoeuvring in terms of its destructive actions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Vladimir Putin’s decision of 16 April 2008 with regards to Abkhazia (on the termination of the 1996 CIS Agreement) following the recognition of the independence of Kosovo was assessed by the Georgian authorities as a clear attempt of de-facto annexation of this region. This view was shared by large part of the international community. Russia deployed “railway engineer” troops and additional armed forces in Abkhazia thereby in fact reanimating the “frozen” conflict. Moscow openly connected these actions to Georgia’s decision to join NATO and formally declared that it would take all necessary measures to prevent NATO enlargement in the South Caucasus. In that regard, Georgia’s refusal of the MAP at the NATO Summit in Bucharest in March 2008 was most likely perceived by Moscow as a kind of incentive from the West.

In spite of the negative stance of Russia with regards to Georgia’s possible integration into NATO, Tbilisi made no steps to seek any other alternatives. Namely, it could have considered the adoption of a legislative act on the non-deployment of the military infrastructure of another country within the territory of Georgia (a French model of NATO membership?) which seems to be of utmost importance for Russia. At the same time, presenting the MAP as a panacea to the Georgian public was an apparent exaggeration. It should also be noted that the Government of Georgia made no efficient steps towards implementing the recommendations made by NATO after the Bucharest Summit. It was less likely, therefore, that Georgia would be granted MAP with such a prospect being disproportional to the risks coming from Russia.

In the spring and summer (June-July) of 2008, the Russian media was intensively engaged in preparations of a proper background for military actions against Georgia. At the same time, Moscow urged the Government of Georgia to sign an agreement on the non-renewal of hostilities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The commitments required by Russia within this agreement are unknown to the Georgian public. The Georgian side, however, had to be more flexible and try to involve its Western partners in the process which would have provided Tbilisi with additional arguments in convincing the international community of its peaceful intentions.

In July, the 58th Russian Army held manoeuvres in the North Caucasus and openly named Georgia as a potential enemy. Moreover, Russia conducted air raids on the territory of Georgia which is a fact admitted by Moscow. The Russian Federation, therefore, explicitly demonstrated the danger Georgia would face if it did not come to an agreement with Moscow after which Russian officials visited Tbilisi in order to discuss an agreement on the non-renewal of hostilities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Also in July, the US State Secretary, Condoleezza Rice, visited Tbilisi at which time her message was clear. “Watch out! There is a trap!”

At present, representatives of the Government of Georgia are making contradictory statements. Some of them say that they did not expect military actions from Russia whilst others argue that the invasion was inevitable. There is no critical analysis of the story which creates a risk for the reoccurrence of similar dramatic events in the future.

The abovementioned mistakes and shortcomings of the Georgian side, however, in no way justify the brutal Russian military aggression and the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Zurab Abashidze,

"Crisis in Georgia, 2008. Preconditions, Reality, Perspectives",

Independent Experts' Club